losing the peace

This comprehensive LAT article on how the post-Saddam occupation of Iraq has gone wrong for want of planning is worthy of being a reference document unto itself. It goes into amazing detail about the contrast between the immense planning spent on preparing for war, and the utter lack of any attention paid to the peace.



But the real kicker is the ending:

"It's not true there wasn't adequate planning. There was a volume of planning. More than the Clinton administration did for any of its interventions," said Rand's Dobbins.



"They planned on an unrealistic set of assumptions," he said. "Clearly, in retrospect, they should have anticipated that when the old regime collapsed, there would be a period of disorder, a vacuum of power They should have anticipated extremist elements would seek to fill this vacuum of power. All of these in one form or another have been replicated in previous such experiences, and it was reasonable to plan for them."



Looking back from the third floor of the Pentagon, Feith dismissed such criticism as "simplistic." Despite initial problems, he said, progress is being made, with order returning to most of the country and a new Iraqi governing council in place.



Still, he and other Pentagon officials said, they are studying the lessons of Iraq closely � to ensure that the next U.S. takeover of a foreign country goes more smoothly.



"We're going to get better over time," promised Lawrence Di Rita, a special assistant to Rumsfeld. "We've always thought of post-hostilities as a phase" distinct from combat, he said. "The future of war is that these things are going to be much more of a continuum



"This is the future for the world we're in at the moment," he said. "We'll get better as we do it more often."

India: the wrong kind of democracy

at least according to the Bush Imperium, which sees any nation that carries out the wishes of its own people, rather than those of the Department of Defense, as traitorous and perfidous. First it was Turkey, not India that refuses to do the Pentagon's bidding. The people of India were against war on Iraq, and Prime Minister Vajpayee is accountable to them, not Bush. So in complying with the wishes of the people of India that troops NOT be sent to Iraq unless it be under a UN mandate, Vajpayee is doing his duty, as the principle of democracy demands.



A principle that the US apparently has abrogated:

As analyst Seema Sirohi put it: "Hell hath no fury like the US scorned." State Department spokesperson Richard Boucher expressed his concerns more diplomatically: "I am not predicting any particular problems. However, we hoped the troops would have been able to go, I think in our interests and what we perceive as their interests as well."



The Bush administration is known to have a vindictive streak. It reacts strongly to countries that don't cooperate in its imperialist ventures. Even before India's decision to reject the US request, William Triplett, former Republican counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said: "A 'No' from India will have an impact although no one will say so in public. The adults in the administration are thought to be more than a bit put out by the Indian parliament's resolution on Iraq, especially its timing. Showing that the Indian army are rolling up their sleeves to help out now will pay dividends with the Americans later."



George Perkovich, vice-president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, believes with other analysts that this administration does not forget easily. He commented earlier: "The administration would be angry or at least disappointed, and if India sends troops, it would be bailing out the Republicans from a growing crisis of occupation without international partners."



So much for the stick. What about the carrots? Has India lost out on them by its decision? Hani Shukrallah, the managing editor of the Arab world's largest-circulated Al-Ahram Weekly, published from Cairo, warned: "Certainly, one can remind the Indian government of the many examples - not least that of Egypt - of American imperial ingratitude." Perkovich appears to agree: "The question Indians should then ask is whether and how the US has 'thanked' those who help it and how long the thanks last." He goes on to predict: "It might help with some high-tech trade issues but others such as nuclear cooperation are constrained by agreements and regimes that the US does not control unilaterally."

Laughably, US officials said that UN Resolution 1483 provided the UN mandate that the Indian people demand. This is absolute nonsense. The UN Resolution had to do with Saddam - what India needs is about the occupation of Iraq. There is no other way to ensure that post-Saddam Iraq becomes a truly free country rather than a vassal of Imperial America (as India and Turkey pointedly refuse to be).



America prefers dictators and tyrants like Mubarak and the monarhs of Saudi Arabia, it seems, to democratic states like India and Turkey... What image shall Iraq be cast in?



UPDATE: The Hindustan Times editorializes:

"Any displeasure which American officials may have voiced privately over India's refusal to send troops to Iraq is unwarranted... If they'd only paid heed to what their military commanders in Iraq were saying, they would have understood the reason for India�s decision... So, it may not have been so much for stabilization and reconstruction that the Americans were eager to have the Indian troops as for fighting the war on their behalf. This is clearly out of the question. In fact, unless there are definitive signs that the war is really and truly over, the Indian troops cannot be expected to go to Iraq... It is India which has a greater reason to voice displeasure because of the manner in which it was sought to be dragged into a quagmire of the Americans' own creation."

And the Guardian points out that the very request for "foreign" troops to act as bullet sponges is arrogant and condescending to the core:

Reports speak of "calls" from congressional committees - shocked by rising estimates of occupation - for "more international sharing" of those costs. Such calls are made as if international help was available on tap whenever the US should choose to turn the faucet. There seems to be scant understanding, despite everything, of the way in which American resistance to cooperation with others, not only on Iraq, might induce in them a reluctance to cooperate with America. Senator Edward Kennedy would not make this mistake, and yet even he can speak of the "best trained troops in the world" tied down in policing in Iraq as if it was self-evident, first, that they are in fact well trained, and, second, that others, not so well trained and more disposable, should take their place. As for Donald Rumsfeld, he is reduced to bizarre musings that the US, which recently closed its peacekeeping centre, might take the lead in training and gathering together an international corps of peacekeepers for use in emergencies.

Our highly trained troops ARE being wasted though. They should be here at home building our econopmy and working our jobs, instead of in Iraq. But to the Republicans, soldiers are just a resource to be freed in Iraq so they can be allocated once again somewhere else:

Still, he and other Pentagon officials said, they are studying the lessons of Iraq closely � to ensure that the next U.S. takeover of a foreign country goes more smoothly.



"We're going to get better over time," promised Lawrence Di Rita, a special assistant to Rumsfeld. "We've always thought of post-hostilities as a phase" distinct from combat, he said. "The future of war is that these things are going to be much more of a continuum



"This is the future for the world we're in at the moment," he said. "We'll get better as we do it more often."

why it matters

Matthew's perspective always drills to the bone:

The war cannot be unfought and everyone, hawk or dove, needs to deal with that reality. The questions then become, on the one hand, what should we do with postwar Iraq, and on the other hand, what should we do with president Bush. It seems to me that if Bush is the sort of president who you think has a tendency to lead the country into wars based on fraudulent evidence, then your answer to that second question should be "get rid of him."



If, by some remarkable coincidence, Bush's fraudulent evidence happened to point toward the invasion of some country that you � for entirely different reasons � also wanted to see invaded, then I think you should consider yourself lucky indeed. Still, you have to wonder whether the next bogus war is going to be one you approve of.

I should point out, via Billmon, that the next bogus war already seemed to have started (albeit briefly).

federalism is a two-state solution

I've learned a great deal by discussing the middle east conflict with Jonathan - and he and I have developed a delicate dance around the issue of whether a two-state solution or a binational union is more beneficial to the long term interests of the Jews and the Palestinians. Jonathan wrote a long series on why he thinks a binational union would not work, (parts I and II) which are also essential reading as a precursor to the discussion.



I think that a lot of the disagreement might stem from a different idea of what a binational union might look like. Seeing as the model is based on the federalist vision of sovereign and separate "states' united under a federal umbrella, I am beginning to think that the two-state solution as favored by Jonathan is not that different from the binational union after all - the Proposal itself characterizes the United States of Israel and Palestine as such:

This proposal outlines the political and territorial configuration of two sovereign states, but in one political and economic union, namely the Federal Union of Palestine-Israel. This reconfiguration is based on the current demographic distribution of both populations and the need to accommodate the returnees from the exiled Palestinian population.



Under this arrangement, areas predominantly inhabited by Palestinian are recommended to be included in a Palestinian state and areas predominantly inhabited by Israelis are recommended to be included in an Israeli state. Areas that are lightly populated and can sustain population are recommended to be included in the Palestinian state in order to accommodate Palestinian refugees. Jerusalem would fall under a separate shared district and would constitute the capital of the Federal Union of Palestine-Israel.



The Palestinian state would include the population of the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, the Galilee (al Jalil) in the north, the centrally located areas known as the Triangle, and the Bir es Saba� region in the south. The Palestinian state would absorb the bulk of exiled Palestinians based on a new territorial configuration that reflects the current demographic distribution of Israelis and Palestinians. Similarly, the Israeli state would comprise those areas where Israelis compose the majority population. Each of the states would have sovereignty over its territories and have its own legislative council. Residents of each state would fall under the jurisdiction of that state regardless of their ethnicity.

Note that the Jewish State in the United States of I-P would still be the true Jewish homeland (to address Uri Averny's main concern). And that the existence of the State of Palestine would also serve to defuse the Right of Return as Jonathan pointed out. But the one facet of the plan that I find the most compelling is how the binational union addresses the question of Israeli security - both internal and external, in a way that the two-state solution does not.



The most immediate threat to the average Israeli is internal. The Proposal tackles the issue head on:

Once the issue of sovereignty and Palestinian national and civil rights have been addressed and resolved, and equitable relations between Israelis and Palestinians have been achieved, the real threats to peace will have been removed and the remainder of the security concerns will be the normal work of the Israeli and Palestinian police departments.



One of the first to define the concept of law was the great Arab philosopher Ibin Khaldun in the fourteenth century. In his definition, the law is the set of measures to be enforced for the protection of man. When the laws in the country are in this spirit, the application of the law and maintaining order is feasible.

This is essentially a restating of the great axiom, "without justice there is no peace." - and part of ensuring the security of the citizens is to ensure that the citizens see justice. Can anyone doubt that a Palestinian state that is totally separate from Israel, with its borders controlled by the IDF, its land encroached by the

Apartheid Wall, and the territory cris-crossed by Israeli highways feeding Israeli settlements, would not perceive any true sovereignity? That there would be no sense of justice? Creating cantons is not the answer - from the Israeli security perspective - because it only boxes the injustice and hatred and allows it to continue to fester.



The only way to ensure that the Palestinian state is not a bantustan in all but name - and to ensure that the primary national goal of New Palestine is not revenge upon its dominating neighbor, is to join the Israeli and Palestinian concerns and aspirations. All parties in teh conflict are rational actors - therefore the solution must equate the self-interests of both parties.



Once this is achieved, then internal security becomes more a matter of police action rather than a military response. The Proposal describes the internal security arrangements that would be needed:

Israeli Police Force: An Israeli police force in the Israeli state would handle all security matters at the state level and be responsible to enforce the law and maintain order in the Israeli state.



Palestinian Police Force: A Palestinian police force would be formed in the Palestinian state and recruit members from residents in the state of Palestine. This department would handle all security matters at the state level in the Palestinian state and be responsible for law enforcement and maintaining order in the state.



District of Jerusalem Police Force: A District of Jerusalem police force would be formed and recruit its members from the District of Jerusalem and be responsible for all security matters in the district.



Bi-state Police Bureau: A Bi-state Police Bureau would be formed and recruit its members from citizens of both states as well as from the residents of the District of Jerusalem and would handle security matters that have a bi-state dimension. The Bureau would also serve as a channel of coordination between the three police departments mentioned above. This Bureau would be formed, administered, and funded by the Federal Union.



Bear Arms: The bearing of arms would be prohibited for residents of both states and as well as the District of Jerusalem with no exceptions.

Note that the Bi-State Police Bureau is key here. Serving the interests of both states, and staffed by members of both communities, it will have a real unifying effect on the political cast of the regional police forces.



And what bout external security threats?

Federal Army: The federal union would maintain an army that is unified and recruit its members from both the Israeli and Palestinian state as well as the district of Jerusalem. The army would defend the international borders of the country against any external threat.



Bi-state Intelligence Service: The federal bureau would maintain a bi-state intelligence service and recruit its members from residents of both states and the District of Jerusalem. This service would monitor and provide information on any external party that poses a threat to the country or either state. This service would be formed, administered, and funded by the Federal Union.



Unified Army: Under this format, the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) would be merged with a Palestinian force in one army. This army will not be perceived as a threat to the security of the nations of the region and will not be the target of hostilities by the regional countries, nor can this army be used to terrorize its citizens.

Again, note the deliberate mixing of the power structures. By joining the identities of both Palestinians and Israelis into a new federal identity, it achieves a great deal of unity without detracting an iota from the separate cultural and religious identities. And that is the glue that holds a society together. All of this joint identity maneuvering is absent from the pure two-state solution, and that is why it would fail.

ties of blood

Jonathan continues his excellent series on analyzing the right of return and how it is not the bogeyman that it has been made out to be. He looks at an analogy between the Palestinians and the thenic German refugees expelled from Eastern Europe after World War II:

The status of the Palestinians as long-term refugees - with some refugee families now in their third or fourth generation - is without doubt one of the factors that makes the right of return such a contentious issue. The Volksdeutsch of Eastern Europe, who have been allowed to build new lives in Germany, have no pressing need to return to their countries of origin, and therefore have far less desire to do so. The Jews who became refugees from Arab countries after the creation of Israel have been absorbed in a similar manner; I'm not aware of any studies of their attitudes toward their homelands, but I suspect that very few would return if given the choice.



In contrast, many of the Palestinian refugees see return as their only way out of statelessness. It is no accident that only 5 percent of Palestinians living in Jordan - who are full citizens of a mostly-Palestinian country - expressed the desire to return to Israel as compared to 23 percent of those living in Lebanon. And even in Jordan, the condition of the Palestinian refugees is not truly comparable to that of the Germans, because refugee camps still exist. Unlike the Volksdeutsch, they have not been completely absorbed and have not entirely left their refugee status behind.



The Palestinians' status is anomalous in the history of refugee problems. Most long-term refugee problems are resolved through resettlement rather than repatriation - refugees either return to their homeland within a few years or never return at all. The Volksdeutsch, the postwar Jewish refugee problem and the 1947 exchange of populations between India and Pakistan all ended this way. Eventually, long-term refugees stop being refugees and become citizens of their host countries.

I might add that the reason that the Palestinian situation is anamolous is solely because of the lack of open societies in the surrounding Arab states. A large influx of Palestinians permitted to settle and assimilate would have threatened the grasp on power of the various regional dictators - and the denial of the refugees the right to settle was tacitly approved by the post-WWII colonial powers (Britain and the US), because after all the regional dictatorships were set up by them in the first place.



Ultimately the Palestinian refugee problem has its roots firmly planted in post-WWII colonialism and modulated by Cold War realpolitik. Only in the Middle East did both of these vast forces intersect.



Jonathan suggests that the fact that refugees want to be assimilated does not threaten the peace process:

Does this mean that Dr. Shikaki's poll results are wrong, and that Israel would experience a similar influx of Palestinian refugees if it conceded a right of return? I don't believe so. ... Palestinians returning to Israel would become residents of what most, in all likelihood, view as someone else's country. In addition, while there is only one Rwanda, a peace settlement between Israelis and Palestinians will result in the Mandate of Palestine being divided into two independent states. Given the choice, most Palestinians - as reflected in the Shikaki poll - will return and rebuild the part of the Mandate that they rule rather than the part the Israelis do. The experience of the Tutsi refugees is more likely to be repeated through a mass repatriation of Palestinians to the West Bank and Gaza, not to Israel.



An interview that Dr. Shikaki gave to National Public Radio shortly after the poll results were released lends further weight to this conclusion. During that interview, he stated that if Israeli citizenship were required as a condition of return, only 1 percent rather than 10 percent of refugees would exercise that option. In other words, 99 percent of Palestinian refugees were unwilling to become citizens of a country they perceived as belonging to someone else. This suggests that, even if Israel conceded an unlimited right of return, fewer than 40,000 refugees would come - a number even less than the 150,000 to 250,000 that I discussed during my initial analysis of the poll. It is likely, moreover, that most of these would be older people with family ties in Israel who would be at very low risk of committing terrorist activity, although it would still be wise for Israel to require all applicants for return to undergo a security check.

Jonathan has been successfully eroding my idealism (but not my pragmatism!) about the binational state solution - and clearly the comparison he draws with Rwanda (read his entire post for the details) seems to suggest that a single state would indeed pose problems that are circumvented with the two-state approach. However, I still believe that the scenario outlined above woudl still work under a binational state framework, because the binational idea has never been about a single unified federal entity whose provinces exist as administrative regions only.



The true binational state solution is based on the federalist model - in fact, I should stop calling it a binational state, and refer to it henceforth as a binational union. The "states" in such a construct are as sovereign as the states in the American Union (sadly less so under Republican rule nowadays). This distinction is completely and totally ignored in most critiques of the binational union idea, such as this Uri Averny piece (courtesy Jonathan) which bases much of its analysis on the utterly false assumption that a binational union would somehow undermine the idea of the Jewishness of the Jewish homeland. Averny is tilting at the non-federal windmill.



In fact Jonathan has suggested to me that I should support the two-state solution as a necessary step towards the binational ideal. It's quite an alluring idea, but I think that it's ultimately unworkable. The basic point of the binational union is to tie the destinies of the two people of Palestine-Israel together in a positive way, to replace the negative death-grip. To suggest that these two peoples, whose blood has mingled on the holiest soil, can somehow erect a wall and go their separate ways is to deny the "facts on the ground" - both the literal ones and the metaphorical ones.

Abizaid tells it straight

Abizaid doesnt have a political agenda. He's just blisteringly competent and qualified.

I believe there's mid- level Ba'athist, Iraqi intelligence service people, Special Security Organization people, Special Republican Guard people that have organized at the regional level in cellular structure and are conducting what I would describe as a classical guerrilla-type campaign against us.



Gen. John Abizaid, Centcom Commander

Pentagon Press Conference

July 16, 2003

see Billmon for quotes from Rumsfeld. Its obvious wwho has the integrity.

the buck stops anywhere but here

via Josh Marshall, this exchange between White House Press Secretary and the press corps:

QUESTION: Regardless of whether or not there was pressure from the White House for that line, I'm wondering where does the buck stop in this White House? Does it stop at the CIA, or does it stop in the Oval Office?



Scott McClellan: Again, this issue has been discussed. You're talking about some of the comments that -- some that are --



QUESTION: I'm not talking about anybody else's comments. I'm asking the question, is responsibility for what was in the President's own State of the Union ultimately with the President, or with somebody else?



Scott McClellan: This has been discussed.



QUESTION: So you won't say that the President is responsible for his own State of the Union speech?



Scott McClellan: It's been addressed.



QUESTION: Well, that's an excellent question. That is an excellent question. (Laughter.) Isn't the President responsible for the words that come out of his own mouth?



Scott McClellan: We've already acknowledged, Terry, that it should not have been included in there. I think that the American people appreciate that recognition.



QUESTION: You acknowledge that, but you blame somebody else for it. Is the President responsible for the things that he said in the State of the Union?



Scott McClellan: Well, the intelligence -- you're talking about intelligence that -- sometimes you later learn more information about intelligence that you didn't have previously. But when we're clearing a speech like that, it goes through the various agencies to look at that information and --



QUESTION: And so when there's intelligence in a speech, the President is not responsible for that?



Scott McClellan: We appreciate Director Tenet saying that he should have said, take it out.



QUESTION: But it's the President's fault.



Scott McClellan: In fact, if you look back at it, I mean, we did take out a different reference, a reference based on different sources in a previous speech because it was said -- the CIA Director said, take it out.



[...]



QUESTION: Scott, on Keith's question, why can't we just expect, basically what would be a non-answer, which is, of course the President is responsible for everything that comes out of his mouth. I mean, that's a non-answer. Why can't you just say that?



Scott McClellan: This issue has been addressed over the last several days.



QUESTION: Why won't you say that, though, that's, like, so innocuous and benign.



Scott McClellan: The issue has been addressed.

(here's the entire transcript)